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Abstract:
economies and to highlight the risks of a zero bound interest rate policy for an economy. The hypothesis that the main interest 
rates and GDP dynamics in the euro area, USA and Poland are statistically significantly related to each other was confirmed. 
The purpose of the article was accomplished using the following methods: a review of the scientific literature, the presentation 
of pertinent statistical data and statistical analysis. Its findings imply that although a low cost of money can stimulate a 
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1. Introduction 
The years of the Great Depression in the 1930s were a 
period of severe deflation. In many countries where 
deflation has occurred despite the nominal interest rate 
having been reduced to almost zero economic activity 
slackened [1]. At the same time, though, in many countries 
deflation has not been accompanied by a lower rate of 
GDP growth. For instance, in 2002, deflation did not 
prevent the Chinese rate of GDP growth from reaching 8% 
[2]. This said, it must be noticed that the literature provides 
more evidence that low interest rates have a negative effect 
on national economies. It is also noteworthy that interest 
rates have a major influence on the rate of economic 
growth and that the influence is negative when they are 
either too high or too low. 
2.  Deflation, zero bound interest rates and an economy 
Economies in deflation have to pay many costs, one of 
place when some debtors have to spend a higher 
percentage of their income to service debt liabilities when 
the amount of loan instalments does not change while their 
income (in monetary terms) decreases as prices fall [3]. A 
major threat related to a zero bound interest rate is the risk 
of collapse of the financial sector, because easily available 
loans are frequently spent on assets, which consequently 
drives their prices upward and thereby the value of 
collaterals [4], [5]. A prolonged period of low interest rates 
can lead to the emergence of a speculative bubble in the 
assets market, the bursting of which can destabilize the 
financial sector [6]. Economists hold different views on 
how a central bank should respond to the emergence or 
bursting of such bubbles. Some argue that because central 
banks cannot recognize that a market bubble is being 
formed, they should focus on offsetting their impacts. A
relevant example is the situation from before the most 
recent financial crisis, when the major central banks 
believed that pursuing a zero bound interest rate policy 
was right even at the risk of deflation [7], [8], [9]. From 
2002 to 2006, the US interest rate was some 2.5% lower 
than that recommended by the Taylor rule [6] 
opinion, the US monetary policy in the pre-crisis years was 
either not restrictive enough or too loose). This departure 
from the Taylor rule lasted longer than in the 1970s. The 
Fed explained this extraordinary reduction of interest rates 
as an intended abandonment of conventional monetary 
policy rules in order to enable a discretionary intervention 
against deflation (such as that observed in Japan in the 
1990s) [10]. The formulas below represent the original 
Taylor rule and its version with parameters calibrated for 
the USA. The first of the formulas is the following: 
where, = the nominal federal funds rate in period t,  =
the annual rate of inflation in period t (%),  = inflation 
target in period t (%),  = GDP gap (demand) in period t 
(GDP deviation from its potential  level,  %),  = the  real  
interest  rate  corresponding  to  full  employment  (natural  
interest rate), ,  = structural parameters.  
The calibrated formula reads as follows [11]:  
Baranowski noted that the Taylor rule offered a guideline 
for monetary policy. As well as facilitating the forecasting 
of interest rates, the rate is also an important element of 
theoretical and empirical models of the national economy 
[12]. 
Another threat arising from a zero bound interest rate 
policy is that low interest rates can make risky projects 
appealing to banks. For instance, interest rate reductions in 
the US increased the risk of loans, because banks started to 
lend at lower prices and to borrowers of questionable 
creditworthiness [13]. Researchers studying Spanish loan 
records spanning a period of 23 years made a similar 
observation. They noted that interest rate reductions were 
followed by an increasing amount of loans granted to 
borrowers that either had a bad borrowing history or did 
not have such history at all. Their conclusion was that the 
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credit risk increases with an extending period of low 
interest rates [14]. Having analysed the impacts of interest 
rates staying low for a long time after the financial crisis, 
Rzonca concluded that the maintenance of zero bound 
interest rates was harmful to economic growth [6]. 
Nevertheless, some economists believe that the 
quantitative easing policy should be continued, because the 
world economy may plunge into another crisis unless 
banks continue to support economic growth with low 
interest rates. 
3.
interest rates and the rate of economic growth in USA, 
the euro area and Poland 
This section presents statistical data on the main interest 
rates, inflation and GDP dynamics in the USA, the euro 
zone and Poland, as well as the results of regression 
economies. 
Table 1 shows the levels of the main interest rates set by 
the central banks in the euro area (the main refinancing 
operation rate), the USA (the federal funds rate) and 
Poland (the reference rate) between 1999 and 2016. 
Because the rates were frequently changed over a year, the 
table presents their annual arithmetic means, excluding the 
US interest rates in the period 2009-2016 that are shown as 
bands. 
Table 1 Main interest rates of central banks in euro area,
USA and in Poland 
Year
Main refinancing 
operation rate 
ECB
Federal funds 
rate USA
Reference 
rate NBP
1999 2,90 5,25 14,50
2000 4,04 6,08 18,25
2001 3,94 3,73 14,43
2002 2,75 1,25 8,28
2003 2,25 1,00 5,88
2004 2,00 1,75 6,08
2005 2,25 3,38 5,15
2006 3,00 4,88 4,13
2007 3,88 4,50 4,63
2008 3,44 1,93 5,54
2009 1,44 0-0,25 3,88
2010 1,00 0-0,25 3,50
2011 1,25 0-0,25 4,13
2012 0,75 0-0,25 4,50
2013 0,38 0-0,25 3,21
2014 0,10 0-0,25 2,00
2015 0,05 0,25-0,50 1,50
2016 0,00 0,25-0,50 1,5
The long-term interest rates were low over the analysed 
years, especially in the euro area and the USA. The Polish 
interest rates are now at their historic low level, but at the 
end of the 20th c. and in the early 21st c., they were much 
higher than in the euro area and the USA. 
Table 2 shows the 1999-2015 economic growth rates for 
the euro area, USA and Poland. The growth dynamics of 
GDP was the lowest in the euro area, somewhat higher in 
the USA, and the highest in Poland. It needs to be noted, 
-
countries (emerging markets) where GDP growth is 
typically higher than in developed economies. 
Table 2  GDP growth in Euro Area, USA and in Poland 
Year
GDP growth rate 
in Eurozone
GDP growth 
rate in USA
GDP 
growth 
rate in 
Poland
1999 3 4,69 4,6
2000 3,8 4,09 4,3
2001 2,1 0,98 1,2
2002 0,9 1,79 1,4
2003 0,6 2,81 3,9
2004 2,3 3,79 5,3
2005 1,6 3,35 3,6
2006 3,2 2,67 6,2
2007 2,9 1,78 6,8
2008 0,4 -0,29 5,1
2009 -4,4 -2,78 1,6
2010 2,1 2,53 3,9
2011 1,5 1,60 4,5
2012 -0,9 2,22 2
2013 -0,3 1,49 1,6
2014 1,1 2,43 3,3
2015 2 2,43 3,6
Table 3 contains annual inflation rates for the euro area, 
USA and Poland in the same period. The rates were low in 
both the euro area and the USA. The Polish inflation rate 
was high in the years 1999-2001 but in 2002, it abruptly 
dropped below 2% to rise above 4% in 2004. An inflation 
rate of 2.4% or less was not noted in Poland until 2012. 
The years 2014-2015 were a period of deflation.  
Table 3 Inflation in Euro Area, USA and in Poland 
Year
Inflation  in 
Eurozone
Inflation  in 
USA
Inflation  
in Poland
1999 2,2 1,1 7,30
2000 3,4 2,1 8,50
2001 2,8 2,3 3,60
2002 1,6 2,2 0,80
2003 2,3 2,1 1,70
2004 2,7 2,1 4,40
2005 3,4 2,2 0,70
2006 3,2 2,2 1,40
2007 2,9 2,1 4,00
2008 3,8 3,3 3,30
2009 -0,4 0,3 3,50
2010 1,6 1,6 3,10
2011 3,2 2,7 4,60
2012 2,1 2,5 2,40
2013 1,5 1,4 0,70
2014 1,6 0,4 -1,00
2015 0,1 0,0 -0,50
Below, a regression analysis of the selected variables is 
presented. It aimed to find out which dependencies 
dynamics in the three selected areas were statistically 
significant in the years 1999-2015 and to test a null 
hypothesis H0
significant) and an alternative hypothesis H1 (the 
parameters are significant). The variables were checked for 
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stationarity with the use of the ADF test (the Dickey
Fuller test). The necessary data were obtained from the 
Eurostat, World Bank and Polish Statistical Office 
websites [15], [16], [17]. 
Table 4 contains the regression results for the USA. The 
independent variables were the nominal federal funds rate 
[FEDF_USA] and the nominal federal funds rate lagged by 
one year [FEDF_USA_1]; the dependent variable was 
GDP dynamics in the USA  [GDP_USA]. 
Table 4 The dependent variable (Y): GDP_USA; 
independent variables (X)  FEDF_USA and 
FEDF_USA_1 
Variable name Coefficient
Standard 
error
t-
Student
p-value
Const
1,88835 0,458773 4,116 0,0012***
FEDF_USA 0,968802 0,263448 3,677 0,0028***
FEDF_USA_1 0,247387 0,0056***
Selected regression statistics and analysis of variance: 2000-2015 
observations (N = 16))
R-square 0,517774
F(2, 13) 6,979167   p-value for F test 0,008732
The data in the table point out that the nominal federal 
funds rate and the federal funds rate lagged by one year 
had a significant effect on GDP dynamics in the sampled 
years. This conclusion is based - statistics of 
3.677 and -3.313, respectively, and on the probabilities of 
obtaining them (0.0028 < p=0.05 and 0.0056 < p=0.05) 
that allow rejecting the null hypothesis H0 in favour of the 
alternative hypothesis H1. There is a 95% probability that 
between 1999 and 2015 both these rates and GDP 
dynamics in the USA were statistically significantly 
related to each other. The value of the coefficient in table 4 
for the second rate, meaning 
that the influence of interest rates on GDP dynamics in the 
USA is consistent with economic theory. Further, the 
coefficient for the nominal federal funds rate is positive 
(0.968802), indicating that the GDP growth rate in the 
USA increases as the Fed raises the federal funds rate.
Table 5 shows the regression results for the euro area. In 
refinancing operation rate [
main refinancing operation rate lagged by one year 
[REF_ECB_1]; the dependent variable was GDP dynamics 
in the euro area [GDP_ECB]. 
Table 5 The dependent variable (Y): GDP_ECB; 
independent variables (X)  REF_ECB and REF_ECB_1 
Variable 
name
Coefficien
t
Standard 
error
t- Student p-value
Const 1,30129 0,540457 2,408 0,0316**
REF_ECB 2,20292 0,363609 6,058 4,04e-05***
REF_ECB_
1
0,389467 0,0001***
Selected regression statistics and analysis of variance: 2000-2015 
observations (N = 16)
R-square 0,739698
F(2, 13) 18,47099   p-value for F test 0,000159
An analysis of the data in table 5 leads to a conclusion that 
rate lagged by one year rate had a statistically significant 
influence on GDP dynamics in the euro area. A proof of 
-statistics of 6.058 and -5.340, 
respectively, and the probabilities of obtaining them 
(4.04e-05 < p=0.05 and 0.0001 < p=0.05) that allow 
rejecting the null hypothesis H0 in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis H1. There is a 95% probability that in the period 
under consideration both these rates were statistically 
significantly related to GDP dynamics in the euro area. As 
only for the  main rate lagged by one year, 
implying, again, that the effect of interest rates on GDP 
dynamics in the euro area was consistent with economic 
nominal interest rate (2.20292) indicates that the raising of 
interest rates by the ECB stimulates GDP growth.
Table 6 presents the regression results for Poland. The 
reference rate [REF
lagged by one year [REF_NBP_1]; the dependent variable 
was the dynamics of Polish GDP [GDP_POL]. 
Table 6 The dependent variable (Y): GDP_POL; 
independent variables (X)  REF_NBP and REF_NBP_1 
Variable 
name
Coefficient
Standard 
error
t-
Student
p-value
Const 4,46671 0,667096 6,696
1,48e-05
***
REF_NBP 0,386282 0,189698 2,036 0,0626 *
REF_NBP_1 0,177164 0,0218 **
Selected regression statistics and analysis of variance: 2000-2015 
observations (N = 16)
R-square 0,355107
F(2, 13) 3,579188   p-value for F test 0,057766
The above data indicate that both independent variables 
significantly 
GDP in the analysed period. This conclusion can be drawn 
from Student t-statistics of 
and from the probabilities of obtaining them (0.0626  < 
p=0.1 and 0.0218 < p=0.05) that allow rejecting the null 
hypothesis H0 in favour of the alternative hypothesis H1. 
There is a 95% probability that in the analysed years the 
reference rate lagged by one year, on the one hand, and the 
significant. The negative value of the coefficient 
was consistent with economic theory again. The 
coefficient for the second rate is positive (0.386282),
meaning that the Polish GDP increased following rises in 
  
The results of the analysis indicate that in the sampled 
interest rates and GDP dynamics were statistically 
significant in the USA, the euro area and Poland. As 
monetary policy plays a significant role in economies, 
central banks need to be watched carefully for changes in 
their interest rates.
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4. Conclusions 
Economic policy makers take interest in deflation only 
when inflation rates fall substantially and the short-term 
interest rates are reduced. The maintenance of near-zero 
nominal interest rates frequently prevents the use of 
measures counteracting deflationary shocks that affect 
price levels and production. The purpose of this article has 
been to highlight that there are significant relationships 
between central banks` main interest rate in the USA, the 
euro area and Poland and the rate of economic growth in 
these regions. As regards the consequences of these 
relationships, both interest rates that are too low or too 
high can have a negative effect on an economy. 
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